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SI: Culture Digitally
The a priori of empirical social life consists of the fact that life 
is not entirely social.
Simmel (1971, p. 14)
It has become common for eminent social and cultural com-
mentators either to dismiss “the social” (as merely the con-
struction necessary to keep the institutional project of 
sociology going: Latour, 2005) or silently to bypass it, 
grounding their understanding of contemporary social 
dynamics in the “harder” terrain of neuroscience (Castells, 
2009). Granted that Latour’s dismissal of “the social” is 
meant as a move to make room for a more thoroughly mate-
rial account of the associations that help make up our experi-
ences called “social” (an outcome to whose value we return 
later), his gesture still has consequences: deliberate or other-
wise, this devaluation of the social as an object of analysis 
ignores the fundamental point that we need the term “social” 
to point to “the totality of complex interrelatedness” that is 
the “basic reality of human existence” (Sewell, 2005, 
p. 326). Insisting on this as our object of analysis does not 
mean reifying “society” or relying only on accounts of the 
social that serve particular accumulations of power. Rather, it 
involves, first, taking the social seriously as a site of neces-
sary, and necessarily contested, representation of whatever 
it is that binds large domains of human interaction together 
and, second, approaching the particular configuration of 
resources and representations that generates the social at any 
one time and space as itself in need of sociological and cul-
tural unpacking within “a properly materialist theory of cul-
ture” (Hall, 1996, p. 48). This is especially important in an 
age when the social has become a site of new economic value 
and intense redefinition—when the term “social media” is 
not a description but an appropriation of the social (Mejias, 
2013). At such a time, to study social media as if the social 
matters means studying digital culture not as “hard” system 
or “soft” processes of meaning-making but as “a dialectic of 
system and practice” (Sewell, 2005, p. 169).
All forms of power have invested in attempts to construct 
reality a certain way, and the age of “social media” is no 
exception. But its constructions work at a different level and 
with a greater intensity than earlier social representations. 
They work through processes of counting and aggregation 
that allow a new and hegemonic space of social appear-
ances to be built:1 a space that does more than hover above 
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everyday practice because its horizons are being built, at the 
level of micro-adjustments of practice, into the habits of 
individual actors, with direct benefits for the accumulation 
strategies of collective actors.
The social is big business, a fact for which the language of 
social theorizing provides useful cover: in a video roadshow 
just before Facebook’s 2012 stock market launch, Mark 
Zuckerberg claimed Facebook was “a fabric that can make 
any experience online social” (quoted van Dijck, 2013, 
p. 67). At work here is a pressure to use the social, and its 
algorithmic reprocessing, as a new frontier where markets 
can be built and value generated. While the prehistory of this 
move is complex, as we note below, the move carries a par-
ticular force that supplants such complex history and installs 
a new normal: a door into a new “social” that will barely 
remember any older ones. A materialist account of the pro-
cesses that give this pressure cultural form must precisely 
hold on to memories of those older versions of the social as a 
reference point against which to judge the hegemonic role in 
hosting social life now played by digital platforms that barely 
existed a decade ago (van Dijck, 2013).
This tension is not, however, new. Simmel (1971) 
expressed the paradox beautifully in the passage already 
quoted above and in the following:
If now we have the conception that we enter into sociability 
purely as “human beings,” as that which we really are . . . it is 
because modern life is overburdened with objective content and 
material demands. (p. 133)
Lefebvre (1958/1991) too (p. 18) at the dawn of the elec-
tronic media age insisted on the everyday as a site of ambi-
guity and contradiction, while Sewell wrote, long before 
the advent of social media, about the importance of a her-
meneutic social science focused on the “de-reification of 
social life” (Sewell, 2005, p. 369, emphasis added). In that 
spirit, we side with those who look to resist the redefinition 
of the social as simply whatever happens “on” social media 
platforms.2
But how to research “social media” platforms responsibly 
in a “culture” of compulsory “connectivity” (van Dijck, 
2013)? Researching the social/media relation today must 
mean more than merely describing how the latest platforms 
work, let alone celebrating their supposedly positive poten-
tial (democratic? expressive? socializing?). It must mean at 
least researching how social media platforms (and the plural 
production cultures that generated them) have come to pro-
pose a certain version of “the social,” and how users go on to 
enact it. It must also mean researching how this social/media 
dialectic is generating ethical or normative concerns, how a 
more effective ethics of social life through media can be 
developed, and registering the fractured spaces from where 
alternative proposals of “the social” might be built. Such an 
account must draw from recent critiques of older sociologi-
cal defenses of “the social”—Latour’s (2005) critique of 
Durkheim for ignoring the heterogeneity of the processes 
whereby experiences of “social” interaction get made; 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) critique of Bourdieu’s inat-
tention to the actual value of pluralism in complex societies—
while holding on to the critical potential of “the social” as 
understanding particular forms of social control (Williams, 
1990, p. 120).
In what follows, we present programmatically some pri-
orities for a materialist account of the culture of digital plat-
forms and the version of “the social” that they work to install: 
first, a brief review of the prehistory of this latest move to 
appropriate the social by media and communications institu-
tions; second, an analysis of how exactly personal data from 
social interaction is now being converted into economic 
value; third, a review of how we might distinguish the pos-
sible long-term consequences of that second process over 
time; and finally, some reflections on the ethical, political, 
and analytic tensions in which this project of analyzing digi-
tal culture involves us.
Some Pre-History
The institutions we have come to call “media” have been 
involved for over a century in providing an infrastructure for 
social life and have invested in a quite particular and privi-
leged means whereby “we” can access whatever is important 
in the social world. Such social claims “for” media were 
often deeply buried in media’s practice, but, as the era of 
mass media began to recede, it became easier to see them at 
work (Couldry, 2000); even before that, various scholars had 
noted the deep relations between the very idea of “media” as 
social institutions, and our particular modern possibilities of 
social, political, or economic order (Beniger, 1987; Scannell, 
1996; Zelizer, 1993).
The web of belief and practice that sustained the idea of 
mass media institutions as social, indeed at the “center” of 
what is social, can, one of us has argued (Couldry, 2014), be 
formulated in terms of myth: the myth of the mediated cen-
ter. This myth has not disappeared, nor have mass media 
institutions’ material basis and self-interested claims to be 
social. But media institutions have recently become entan-
gled in a different project: the attempt by other (new) “mass 
media” institutions to build online spaces where the econ-
omy and social life can unfold. Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo 
do media on a mass scale, but through a very different spatial 
configuration from that of classic mass media. Instead of dis-
tributing the same content out to “everyone” as mass broad-
casters have done, they provide online “platforms” (Gillespie, 
2014) where “anyone” can interact with anyone else. Such 
interactions, broadly, follow whatever path people choose 
but, as Marx would have put it, not in conditions of their own 
choosing: indeed in conditions precisely that these new 
media institutions choose, conditions that, while they differ 
considerably depending on each site’s technological design, 
business model, and political background, have in common 
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the deep and continuous algorithmic tracking of whatever 
interactions occur on these platforms.
Accompanying this radically new relation between media 
institutions and “the social” is an emerging web of belief: a 
“myth of us” (Couldry, 2015) that underwrites the belief, on 
which those platforms rely, that this is where “we” now 
come together. As with the myth of the mediated center, the 
myth of us is not a simple discrete credo, but an overdeter-
mined pattern in how resources and actors are organized that 
reflects a number of other influences too: neoliberal models 
of market-based agency and the search for new forms of 
popular politics at a time of mistrust in political institutions. 
But the emergence of “the myth of us” is important, not just 
for the striking reorganization of daily interaction that it rep-
resents but because its pattern expresses the business model 
and the implicit goal or telos around which, whatever the 
complexity of their origins, today’s “social media” plat-
forms have come to converge: to harness for value a vast 
domain of interaction that can plausibly stand in for social 
life itself through installing mechanisms for counting and 
valuing action in the very domain of everyday interaction 
the myth naturalizes.
Personal Data and Economic Value
Calling an algorithmically defined online configuration 
“social” has been one of the smartest semantic moves in the 
history of media institutions. Online sociality increasingly 
serves as a proxy for social interaction, whereas, in fact, this 
“social” comes as an effect of a new dominant techno-eco-
nomic materiality. At the same time, this materiality makes 
itself virtually invisible and thus intractable to those analyti-
cal modes of interpretation conventionally used in the 
humanities and social sciences to interpret social interaction. 
It would be misleading of course to forget the longer history 
of governments and corporations counting populations and 
producing quantitative measures as a basis for imagining the 
social domains over which they rule (Porter, 1996), but even 
that history fails to prepare us for the force of these new 
enactments of the social: an attempt to install a redefinition 
of the “social” through new infrastructures of association, 
rather than some already existing sense of “connectedness” 
(“communities”) or collectivity (“us”). Here, Latour’s (2005) 
attention to the constitutive force of associations and, much 
earlier, Callon and Latour’s (1981) account of how building 
“obligatory passing-points” for actors and objects enables 
new possibilities of “representation” are crucial.
This new techno-economic materiality can hardly be 
understood without probing its underpinning principles of 
datafication, manipulation, and commoditization. Using the 
word “social” to describe computational connectivity has 
been a peculiar example of reversification—a process in 
which words come to have a meaning that is opposite to, or 
at least very different from, their original sense. When Mark 
Zuckerberg vowed in 2010 that Facebook’s mission in life 
was “to make everything social,” he really meant: to move 
social traffic onto a networked infrastructure where it 
becomes traceable, calculable, and so manipulable for profit.
If in the 19th and 20th centuries economic forces infil-
trated the specific domains of leisure, sports, and public 
communication, in the first decade of the 21st century, it is 
the whole domain of informal connections and interpersonal 
exchange that has been absorbed by commercial platforms. 
Building an online infrastructure onto the World Wide Web, 
a few large companies managed to monopolize viable “social 
niches” such as searching information, chatting with friends, 
and exchanging cultural content. The automated mechanisms 
emanating from these connective platforms now dictate how 
online sociality is structured. Google’s search engines never 
mimicked a social process of searching information; they 
created a new system of data circulation based on algorith-
mically defined criteria of quantified popularity. Facebook’s 
“friending” or “liking” buttons have little basis in the social 
reality of consolidating friendships or preferring cultural 
content (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013); they are computational 
systems that assign data their value as economic currency in 
a global online sociality.
Personal data—both the information we yield voluntarily 
and behavioral data reaped without our knowledge—have 
become the scalable resources of the new online economy. 
Data can hardly be considered extractions of pre-existing 
social interaction: the platform infrastructures provide novel 
playing fields where communication and exchange of data 
follow designated routes. Through this platform apparatus, 
personal data become part of aggregated collections that can 
be disconnected and reconnected at will for corporate, not 
social, ends. The “social” as newly defined becomes an effect 
of online sociality rather than the other way around: flows of 
data are triggered to produce systems of economic gain—
systems that revolve around the accumulation of attention 
and a sustained, if implied, claim that accumulated attention 
(as measured) is social value. In mass media, professionals 
select content that draws eyeballs in order to sell attention to 
advertisers; in social media, platform owners design algo-
rithms that simultaneously connect users to content and ads, 
thus maximizing the efficacy of eyeball attention. Rooted in 
the principles of automated popularity (number of clicks) 
and connectivity (number of relationships), online platforms 
become the arteries of a new online “social”—enabling, pro-
moting, distributing, and steering data flows. Minute regis-
tration of every single online move translates into a new 
algorithmic proposal for further online interaction. In other 
words, personal data become the “nudging input” for person-
alized content output—a fully automated process in which 
algorithms serve as editorial as well as advertorial agents 
(Gillespie, 2014).
Manipulation and commodification are not the conse-
quences of datafication; all three mechanisms are intrinsically 
intertwined in the configuration of the platform ecosystem as 
preconditions of its use and exploitation—an ecosystem that, 
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although its elements have emerged over time and from mul-
tiple sources, is the object on which business objectives are 
now firmly targeted. The new playing field is not a level one, 
where independent social actors choose between discrete 
consumer options. A few powerful platforms and partnering 
corporations define the gateways and control the signposts to 
the flows of content and data they can assume users will pro-
duce. Google and Facebook, as two of the most powerful 
gatekeepers, each control a vertically integrated chain of plat-
forms and search algorithms, allowing them to define the con-
ditions for online traffic. In their meticulous analysis of 
“Googlenomics,” Rieder and Sire (2014) demonstrate how 
the Silicon Valley–based search mogul procures a mesh of 
“tangled activities” through a string of interrelated platforms, 
from search engine to advertising agency and from user-gen-
erated content platform to social network service. Google’s 
command over the flow of personal data and content data is 
inscribed in the very mechanisms that enable their material-
ization; it is increasingly difficult to understand the complex 
economic fabric of online sociality:
[F]rom a media and communication perspective, analysis and 
critique have to adapt to a new situation in which money, power 
and visibility flow in new and complicated ways, content is 
managed as data, advertising is priced and distributed by 
algorithms and media bias is a set of parameters applied to 
millions of units at a time. (Rieder & Sire, 2014, p. 14)
Common economic and governmental terms like con-
sumer welfare or anti-trust legislation seem to fail to capture 
this new online complexity, allowing the ecosystem to 
develop its own socio-legal conditions (Cohen, 2012) and 
control the marketplace of connectivity.
In these vertically integrated chains of platforms, social 
networks like Google+ and Facebook increasingly position 
themselves as gatekeepers to all online activity. Marc 
Zuckerberg’s earlier mentioned claim from 2012 that 
Facebook is “a fabric that can make any experience online 
social” makes yet another twist in the process of reversifica-
tion when we realize that online identification increasingly 
takes place through the border patrol of Facebook and Google. 
Platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, and thousands of smaller 
online market places use Facebook-verified access to control 
their users. Traffic control comes at a price: the exchange 
value for ID services is data access, and through these gate-
way services, Facebook and Google install themselves at the 
heart of the data economy. We are constantly confronted with 
stories about Uber customers or Airbnb hosts as empowered 
socio-economic agents, but overlooked in these stories is how 
so many online platforms are built upon on, and dependent 
upon, algorithmic foundations designed and controlled by a 
few increasingly powerful data companies.3
In this global system, the “social” appears as a derivative 
of the techno-economic—and yet, this is not a system that 
can be separated from everyday use or users of social media. 
Users are at the center of online sociality, giving away their 
data in exchange for free services. However, defining per-
sonal data as “raw resources” that fuel the apparatus obscures 
the power of platforms as driving forces of every online 
interaction and profoundly misreads such data’s ontology 
(Gitelman, 2013). Any interpretation of data as a reflection 
of an underlying “social” reinforces the ideology of dataism 
or the myth of big data (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Couldry, 
2014; Crawford, 2013; van Dijck, 2014).
The “social” of “social media” platforms is of course 
lived out by social actors, who are trying to achieve their 
individual and collective goals, more or less in coordination 
with each other. The last thing we want to do is dismiss that 
field of action as unimportant or inconsequential. Our point, 
rather, is that the coextension between so many everyday 
domains of social exchange and interaction and the managed 
continuities from which economic value is today being 
extracted poses unprecedented dangers for collective life. 
Superficially, there is a similarity with how earlier media 
institutions represented the social “out there” back to the 
mass audiences who were living it, but what today’s repre-
sentation of the “social” is routed through stands in for some-
thing much closer to home: through what you or I are doing, 
now, our daily habits, adjustments and aspirations, the very 
spaces where we feel we need to be.
Consequences: Theorizing “The 
Dialectic of System and Practices”
For humanities and social science scholars still committed 
to holding on to the critical potential of the term “social,” it 
seems particularly urgent to research the longer term conse-
quences of such commercially driven enactments: in politics 
and government, in everyday practices such as informal 
communication, or in public domains such as education, 
health, or law and order. “Researching the consequences” 
may be an awkward term for what is really theorizing the 
“dialectic of system and practices” as earlier suggested in 
the words of Sewell (2005, p. 169). The infiltration of con-
tinuous algorithmic tracking and models for predicting 
online movements into our daily social and cultural prac-
tices may be shaping the way in which the “social”—or 
rather, society—is organized, but of course such processes 
are never simple or without possibilities for contestation or 
resistance (Couldry & Powell, 2014; Couldry, Fotopoulou, 
& Dickens, in press). With that caveat, let us sketch some 
implications for three very different areas: health, educa-
tion, and government.
In the area of health and illness, social media platforms 
are setting the standard for organizing communication and 
normative behavior. Self-reported fitness data fuel platforms 
such as Fitbit—a platform providing wearable devices that 
track personal metrics related to standardized healthy behav-
ior, such as heartbeats, blood pressure, footsteps, quality of 
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sleep, or sugar levels. Users constantly exchange and report 
metrics so that aggregated information can provide “normal-
ized” standards for certain age groups. On the other end of 
spectrum, we find very similar platforms for self-reporting 
information about sickness. Users of the popular site 
PatientsLikeMe, for instance, exchange detailed information 
about their (chronic) diseases and the effectiveness of treat-
ment, satisfying patients’ need to communicate their suffer-
ing by letting them share personal experiences. While the 
therapeutic function of health-related narratives has not sud-
denly disappeared, they now often perform a double func-
tion, the generation of health data: that is, self-reported 
effects of certain treatments, once transferred to an online 
environment, can be translated into objectified data, even if 
they are not solicited via standardized protocols. Quantifying 
people’s physical conditions through self-reported data has 
introduced a new way of organizing health that perfectly 
illustrates Foucault’s theory of normalization, not just in gen-
eral terms but through the precise bodily adjustments and 
orientations that it strives to inculcate (the very idea of the 
quantified self).
Automated health and illness tracking does not appear as 
a by-product of online sociality, but constitutes a new eco-
nomic and physical reality for researchers, doctors, pharma-
ceutical companies, data companies, and no doubt many 
patients too. Platform owners of Fitbit and PatientsLikeMe 
present their sites as products that serve the public good, with 
self-reported health data becoming public records that may 
lead to remedies and therapies. While narratives about health 
in contemporary societies remain in general terms highly 
contested, that does not override the peculiar force of regimes 
of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) that work by 
the automatic secretion of data about actors’ bodies to shared 
platforms and databases. Meanwhile, access to different non-
datafied models of understanding health and health risks 
weakened over time.
A second example of how social media dynamics may be 
influencing the organization of the social is in (higher) educa-
tion. As with health, learning processes are increasingly trans-
ferred to online environments, or made dependent on the 
mediation of platform-like classroom tools, where they have 
to succumb to the principles undergirding the larger ecosys-
tem of connective media. A large number of American school 
systems have introduced algorithmic tracking systems into 
the classroom, measuring and quantifying the learning pro-
cess of children while sharing these data with (corporate) 
platform owners. In higher education, we have witnessed the 
explosive growth of massive open online courses (MOOCs) 
provided by platforms such as Coursera, edX, and Udacity, 
built on the same mechanisms underpinning the larger data-
driven online sociality. MOOCs are driven by reputational 
systems of peer voting and popularity rankings; learning pro-
cesses become data processes and so more readily translat-
able into tradable units. MOOCs use the same business 
models that dominate social media platforms: offering “free” 
courses in exchange for user data and additional “freemium” 
services. This new platform architecture, built on datafica-
tion, commodification, and compulsory connectivity, recon-
figures the relations between learners, teachers, and 
institutions. Rather than “mimicking” the social process of 
learning in an online environment, these new tools for online 
instruction may, if implemented more widely, deeply affect 
the pedagogical and economic value propositions of college 
education. Once again, our point is not to deny that the pro-
cesses and outcomes of such transformations are contested or 
complex, but rather to notice the facticity of these particular 
distributed processes of evaluation and their role in reshaping 
the reference points for society’s organized attempts to shape 
the human resources of its future (i.e. education).
A third area is government. Government of course has little 
freedom simply to experiment with its modes of operation: too 
many other processes depend on it. Within modernity, govern-
ment techniques for gathering information about its constitu-
encies were the reference point for all other social narratives it 
produced and laid claim to. There was unsurprisingly there-
fore some concern when, in September 2013, the UK govern-
ment appeared to signal a willingness to abandon its 10-year 
census issued to every household in the nation, arguing that 
existing data sources (including commercially available 
sources) might be more comprehensive and cost-effective 
(Dorling, 2013). As it turned out, the Office of National 
Statistics did not recommend this drastic action (Office of 
National Statistics, 2014). The long-term future, however, 
remains uncertain and will depend on the role of other provid-
ers of social knowledge and the new context for understanding 
the social that evolves over the next decade. To the extent that 
social media data are regularly claimed to be a better (because 
more continuous and comprehensive) source of social knowl-
edge about the whole population and is funded accordingly, 
the landscape of government’s claims to know society will 
also gradually shift. This underlines the importance for aca-
demics, across the social sciences and humanities, to contest 
claims to equate “the social”—as it is constructed through eco-
nomically driven infrastructures designed to make a social 
appear—with the only forms of social life that matter.
Difficulties
The resources for describing social processes and social real-
ity have never been evenly distributed, nor are they ever 
likely to be, and organized attempts to marshal such resources 
into particular authoritative accounts of the social are hardly 
new. What we face, however, is a new type of appropriation 
of such representational resources whereby the very space 
where sociality appears is being rebuilt (recalibrated) to pro-
duce a particular measurable kind of “social.” Although the 
temptation to see continuities back to earlier forms of public 
sociality and the measurement of populations is strong, a dis-
continuity is at work here that our previous languages for 
describing the social fail to grasp. The answer is not to give 
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up on the language of “the social,” but to explore new ways 
of holding to, indeed recovering, a recognition of other sites 
of social knowledge—other ways of being social—that are 
not easily counted or tracked and do not ipso facto constitute 
an automatic source of economic value for anyone.
A time when society’s languages for describing itself are 
being appropriated to particular ends poses at least three 
types of challenge. First, there is increasing normative dis-
quiet at the costs (for quality of life) of the compulsion to 
connect, which is the practical sine qua non of data and value 
generation in a culture of connectivity (van Dijck, 2013). 
Those costs are troubling, not just because they are heavy (in 
terms of information overload and stress) but because they 
seem non-negotiable (a 16-year-old asked Sherry Turkle, 
“how long do I have to continue doing this?”; Turkle, 2011, 
p. 168). The only way of opening up those costs to negotia-
tion is to hold on to other “platforms” for social life: indeed 
to de-reify the very discourse of “platform” that, as Gillespie 
(2010) has powerfully argued, has done such important work 
in generating the present moment.
Second, it is not easy to make a political object out of 
today’s corporate ambitions to own the spaces of interaction 
(Mejias, 2013) because almost every attempt to challenge 
such ambitions will itself involve the use of just such spaces. 
But the attempt must still be made. That means holding on to 
languages of political contention and orientation that are not 
easily reducible to metrics and to languages of transforma-
tion that only work because they require interpretation and 
which, for that reason, necessarily acknowledge the diversity 
of evaluative perspectives in a complex world.
Third, there is an analytic difficulty. It is very hard to find 
a meta-language that can capture the ways and levels in/on 
which this new “social” is being constructed in and around 
us. Talk of “logics” or “myths” gets us some of the way, by 
helping us “see together” the pattern of rearrangement (of 
resources, actions, and norms) that is being enacted in every-
day practice. Actor Network Theory’s insights into how the 
social is built from many heterogeneous elements are also a 
vital part of our toolkit, despite some of Latour’s rhetoric 
about “the social” in his grander pronouncements. Particularly 
important will be a new wave of empirical work that tracks 
in everyday life the mechanisms by which today’s space of 
social appearances is being built, its entry and exit points, 
and rules of operation. We need a combination of theory, 
analysis, and observation that can give some shape to our 
inchoate sense that something important is missing from the 
version of “the social” now on offer in the domain we have 
come to call “social media.” Social media and society: 
unraveling this knot of power and representation may prove 
communication research’s greatest challenge yet.
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Notes
1. We echo Arendt (1960) ironically: there is no way back to a 
world where people enter the public space of appearances sim-
ply by choosing to walk into a public square. Who and what 
appears in the space of social media, and how, is already the 
basis of a system-based calculation, as we discuss in a later 
section.
2. We are building here on earlier work (Couldry, 2014, 2015; 
van Dijck, 2013) and following in the steps of some important 
voices that have begun to challenge the reification of social 
media: Robin Mansell’s Imagining the Internet (Mansell, 
2012), Sarah Banet-Weiser’s Authentic™ (Banet-Weiser, 
2012), and Ulises Mejias’ Off the Network (Mejias, 2013). All 
authors seek to imagine an oppositional space outside corpo-
rate attempts to appropriate the social to economic ends.
3. For a rare reflection on such power, see “So Who Needs 
Facebook Friends?” (2014).
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